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LECTURE
IMMIGRATION AT THE TURN OF THE NEW CENTURY*
Peter H. Schuck**
Migration is perhaps the most insistent world phenomenon of our
age. The propensity to migrate in search of a better life has always been
among the most powerful of human drives, and perhaps never more than
today.
Migration theorists attempting to explain population movements
often distinguish between so-called push and pull factors. Before the
modem age, push factors, such as population pressures, starvation, soil
exhaustion and other economic and environmental dislocations,
persecution, and warfare probably accounted for almost all human
migration. Today, however, contemporary conditions have sharpened
many of these traditional migratory spurs. Better and cheaper
communications and transportation technologies have also brought various
pull factors into play, such as the unification of far-flung families,
globalizing work and trade opportunities, and the lure of more stable and
tolerant nation-states.
This migration is truly a world phenomenon. For now, at least,
these migratory pressures are perhaps greatest on North America--
particularly on the United States but also, to a lesser extent, Canada. Social
and political conditions in Central and South America have created a vast,
growing pool of poor, unemployed, and mobile people with rising
expectations and their eyes fixed northward. Only a long, permeable, and
intermittently defended border separates them from the magnetic American
labor market, a border that they have been crossing for generations with
only temporary setbacks. The migratory pressures, however, are
unprecedented for Western Europe except during World War II. Only the
Mediterranean (or perhaps only the Straits of Gibraltar) and the porous
buffer states of central Europe, such as Poland, protect western Europe
from potential flows of desperately poor, low-skilled, and ethnically diverse
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workers and their families from Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. These
flows could eventually dwarf those now reaching North America.
In this brief essay, I want to advance two broad propositions. First,
I contend that these migratory pressures pose a challenge to the U.S. and to
the other destination states whose stakes can hardly be exaggerated.
Second, I argue that the U.S., despite its well-known immigration policy
failures, is nevertheless meeting this challenge more effectively and justly
than perhaps any other major immigrant-receiving state. Only Canada is
even arguably comparable, and its context is in some ways quite different
from the United States.
I. THE STAKES
U.S. immigration policy, together with America's distinctive social
and legal modes of assimilating immigrants, determine--in a tautological
sense--the answers to the kinds of political identity questions that arise in
any democratic polity: Who are we? What do we wish to become? How
shall we reach that goal? And, most fundamentally, which individuals
constitute the "we" who shall decide these questions--in more formal terms,
the "We the people" who govern ourselves in the name of the United States
of America under the Constitution?
In the calamitous Dred Scott decision of 1857, Chief Justice Roger
Taney held that this last question had been resolved at the Founding and
that the Founders' answer excluded slaves and the descendants of slaves
from membership in the American polity. The Civil War decisively
rejected that answer, of course, and the constitutional amendments that
ensued set us on a path whose broad inclusiveness would have astonished
all of the framers of those Reconstruction amendments and would surely
have appalled some of them.
The stakes involved in defining "We the people" can be understood
by considering three temporal perspectives on that definition: past, present,
and future. Thinking about the past invites us to imagine our political
identities as connected in some sense to those who created and constantly
transformed the polity and society that today's Americans have inherited.
Every nation tells itself stories about foundings, bloodlines, ancestry,
peoplehood, nation-building struggles, and cultural development. Some of
these stories, of course, are more true than others, but historical accuracy is
not the stories' point; self-definition is. In any event, these stories together
constitute a nation's historical identity, or what political theorist Benedict
Anderson called its "imagined community."
This imagined community in the American case is no longer the
community of white, Anglo-Saxon Protestants and their descendants who
established the colonies in the 17d' century. In his recent book, Civic Ideals,
my Yale colleague Rogers Smith elaborates the principal competing visions
of American political identity through the Progressive Era. He argues that
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the now-dominant mythos of a diverse, inclusive, immigrant nation, of an
amalgam of cultures forming a civic polity in which membership depends
not on any particular ethnicity or sectarian creed, but only on a belief in the
principles of the Constitution, was never firmly established but has always
been besieged by other, more restrictive visions that promote, and
sometimes secure, racist politics and exclusionary policies. Unlike Smith, I
believe that the more inclusive vision has now triumphed decisively and
permanently. Although it will always be fiercely contested, it is now firmly
entrenched in U.S. law, politics, and institutions.
The perspective of the present focuses on who is--and who should
be-- entitled to decide on the shape of American society. It is concerned
with political-democratic competence, with rules governing participation,
and with the cultivation of those values, faculties, and institutions that tend
to produce wise and engaged citizens who will cherish and seek to enrich
and perpetuate this kind of polity. Finally, the perspective of the future
considers what we want our society to look like and which policies are
likely to move us toward that goal.
These three perspectives on the identity of "We the people" are
intimately connected, of course, and cannot really be disentangled. Our
future as a society largely depends on our current choices. (I say "largely"
because we have imperfect control of the conditions that shape society.)
These choices in turn inevitably reflect how we understand our peoplehood
and its history, and what our aspirations for the nation are. Immigration
policy is one of the most consequential of those choices for a very simple
reason: it affects literally everything else.
Consider how immigration shapes demographics, economics, and
politics. Current immigration policies determine, literally, what America
"looks like" now and will look like in the future. Immigration is a
significant driver of U.S. population growth, today accounting for almost
40% of that growth. Immigrants not only increase the population
themselves but also tend to have higher fertility rates than Americans
generally. (However, these fertility differences diminish over time.) The
current level of "permanent" immigration to the U.S., including both legal
and illegal flows, is as high or higher than at any time in American history.
The percentage of the U.S. population that is foreign-born is steadily rising
and now approximates 10%, which is still well below the 14% share
reached in the first decade of the 2&t century. Immigration's demographic
effects, however, go well beyond mere numbers, determining the age,
racial, ethnic, linguistic, religious, and source-country composition of the
population, as well as how the population is distributed geographically
across the U.S.
Immigration is also a major determinant of our economic profile.
On the labor supply side, immigration affects the mix of job skills available
in the economy as well as the prevailing wage rates, entrepreneurial
investment, and the conditions of work. Immigration also affects the
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demand side--consumer goods, human capital, housing, education, social
services, and a host of other goods and services. These myriad effects
mean that immigration's economic impact is by no means confined to the
immigrants themselves but extend to the rest of the population.
Consider the "non-immigrant" workers admitted for ostensibly
"temporary" work. Congress has steadily liberalized these guestworker
programs with respect to numbers, eligibility conditions, and opportunities
to adjust to permanent status, and will continue to do so as the result of
additional amnesties enacted already or in the near future. On the low-skill
side, the U.S. has been formally admitting agricultural workers for
temporary and seasonal periods at least since the Bracero program was
established in 1943, yet a large number of these workers have managed to
remain permanently in the U.S. Many of these have obtained permanent
legal status; 2.7 million did so under the 1986 amnesty program alone, and
many more will do so under new amnesty provisions. On the high-skill
side, President Clinton has just signed the "American Competitiveness in
the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000," passed by overwhelming bipartisan
votes in both houses, which will further expand the H-lB visa program
(doubled as recently as 1998) to admit for each of the next three years
195,000 computer programmers, computer scientists, systems analysts, and
other high-tech workers for periods of up to six years. If past is prologue,
many of these temporary workers will actually end up receiving permanent
residence visas. Today, about one in six U.S. workers is foreign-born.
Finally, immigration profoundly shapes our politics at all levels.
Immigration policy was a fiercely-contested issue throughout the 1980s and
1990s. Indeed, the year 2000 national elections are the first in many years
in which immigration is not a major campaign issue. Its political impacts,
however, transcend particular election cycles or policy debates. Almost
875,000 immigrants naturalized in 1999, a number that was limited because
of the huge backlog at the INS, where 865,000 immigrants were awaiting
naturalization in September 2000. Because immigrant groups are not
randomly distributed either ideologically or geographically, their political
preferences can significantly affect candidates' policy positions.
Immigration's political effects are further magnified by the U.S. federal
system. With immigrants heavily concentrated in a relatively small number
of states and metropolitan areas, they may hold the balance of power in
some state and local elections. A small number of localities, moreover,
permit non-citizens to vote in their elections, a practice that other
jurisdictions may well adopt in the future as their immigrant populations
grow.
Immigration politics can affect a wide range of domestic policy
issues, but its most obvious impact is on foreign policy. Immigrant groups
retain a special interest in U.S. policy toward their countries of origin. This
interest often extends well beyond the groups' first and second generations
in the U.S., as the experiences of hyphenated Americans ranging from
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Armenians to Zambians demonstrate. One cannot understand U.S. policy
toward Cuba, the Middle East, the former Soviet Union, and India without
taking Americans' continuing ethnic linkages into consideration. And quite
apart from these linkages, much immigration policy deeply implicates our
relations with other countries--a fact often stressed by the Supreme Court
when it invokes the "plenary power doctrine" as a justification for judicial
deference to the political branches on immigration-related issues.
The immense stakes in immigration policy are nicely captured in
the apocryphal lamentation of Chief Sitting Bull after the disastrous battle
that forced his tribe to leave their ancestral lands: "We should have paid
more attention to our immigration policy."
II. THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF THE U.S. RESPONSE TO THE MIGRATION
CHALLENGE
The U.S. approach to migration, I want to argue, is distinctive and
in some ways unique among the world's nation-states. In some important
areas, America's performance has been highly successful by any
comparative standards. Examples include the integration of immigrants
into American society and the "management" (for want of a better term) of
migration-related diversity. In some other areas of immigration policy,
however, the U.S. has failed, although perhaps no more than other receiving
countries have failed. Examples include its inability to control undocu-
mented migration, to expeditiously remove criminal aliens, and perhaps
most important, to lawfully, equitably, and efficiently administer the
immigration statute. Both the successes and the failures of U.S. policy are
essential parts of the overall record.
Probably the most unique feature of American society is its
affirmative embrace of diversity of every conceivable kind: demographic,
ethnic, linguistic, religious, economic, cultural, geophysical, and so forth.
No other state exhibits America's level of diversity over so many different
social domains, and no other state views diversity not as a regrettable
necessity with which it must somehow make its peace not as a grudging
concession to a colonial past, but rather as a condition that society values as
an end in itself. The only possible exception is Canada, which occupies an
enormous land mass with only 28 million inhabitants, and is eager to
increase its population. Indeed, Canada's very survival as a nation
demands a fundamental commitment to protect cultural diversity, one
enshrined in its constitution.
Indeed, the U.S. in 1990 enacted a program authorizing the creation
of 55,000 permanent immigration slots, denominated as "diversity" visas in
the statute, that were designed to increase migration to the U.S. from source
countries whose nationals had supposedly been disadvantaged by the
elimination in the 1965 law of the system of national origins quotas. Using
immigration policy to increase the already extraordinary diversity in the
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U.S. is even more remarkable because an inevitable consequence is to
accelerate an irreversible transformation of the nation's racial, ethnic, and
religious composition, a fact that is widely understood in the U.S.
I am aware of no other society in history that has accepted such a
transformation with its eyes wide open. Indeed, as noted earlier, the U.S.
has not merely acquiesced in its transformative diversity; it has
affirmatively contrived and embraced it, even fashioning an ideology of
diversity designed to justify this development. Canada's multi-cultural
policy is more extensive than that of the U.S. but Canada, unlike the U.S.,
requires its policy in order to quell separatist movements that even now
threaten to unravel the nation. France, Germany, and some other EU states
are moving slowly toward a greater acceptance of diversity. In each case,
however, their limited moves toward acceptance of diversity are grudging,
politically fragile, and possibly reversible.
The most dramatic evidence of the ardent commitment of the U.S.
to diversity is that both major parties and virtually all political elites support
the expansionist legal immigration policy that Congress enacted a decade
ago in the midst of an economic recession (albeit one that we now know
was relatively mild), a policy that political leaders of both parties have now
maintained through an entire business cycle and show no signs of
abandoning. Indeed, the platforms of the Democratic and Republican
parties on immigration and diversity issues (other than affirmative action)
for the 2000 elections are almost indistinguishable.
The U.S., moreover, is the only major immigration receiving
country in which no significant nativist or even restrictionist party exists.
Underscoring this remarkable fact is the continued political marginality of
Pat Buchanan's party despite its receipt of substantial federal subsidies for
its campaign. Even organized labor, the strongest traditional opponent of
expansive immigration, now favors both a new amnesty for long-term
resident undocumented aliens and the repeal of the 1986 employer
sanctions law that discourages firms from hiring undocumented workers
who might compete with union members for jobs.
This broad political support in the U.S. for expansive immigration
becomes even more remarkable when one considers the policy context.
First, as noted earlier, the racial, ethnic, linguistic, religious, and source
country composition of current immigration to the U.S. is more diverse than
ever before. Today, almost three-quarters of legal immigrants are from
Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean; the five leading source countries
are Mexico, the Philippines, India, Vietnam, and mainland China. Few of
these immigrants are white and only the Philippines and India send many
fluent English-speakers. Relatively few immigrants have the European
ancestry that largely peopled the U.S. originally. More Muslims and
Hindus now live in the U.S. than do Episcopalians, and the gap is certain to
grow.
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Second, this diversity is not unproblematic. It poses massive,
arguably unprecedented challenges to the capacity of the U.S. to assimilate
these immigrants, especially those who lack strong job and English
language skills in a technologically advanced economy. Yet the legal
admissions criteria for immigrants show little concern about whether or not
they possess those skills. Indeed, the vast majority are selected for
permanent residency because they are related to U.S. citizens or permanent
resident aliens. Well under 20% are selected for their job skills, and neither
English fluency nor other indicia of easy assimilability other than family
ties is a direct criterion at all. (As we shall see, many temporary immigrant
visas are skills-related, though most are not.) The U.S. admits many low-
skill immigrants despite the fact that it has a large native-born population of
low-skill workers who already suffer from low wages and relatively high
unemployment rates.
Third, an estimated 8 million illegal migrants live more or less
permanently in the U.S. today, with the number growing by 250,000-
300,000 each year. The fact that these levels are as high or higher than ever
before is not due to policymakers' inattention or passivity. During the last
decade when Congress imposed budgetary discipline throughout the federal
government, it vastly increased the fiscal and staffing resources allocated to
border and interior enforcement. The U.S., it is fair to say, has now tried
every plausible legal, political, and technological remedy for this problem
without substantially reducing the overall illegal flow.
Fourth, a large and growing population of criminal aliens exists in
the U.S. despite more energetic efforts by the INS to deport them and, even
though many of them are in custody or under supervision, they have no
political support or legal defenses, and are subject to swift removal under
new enforcement procedures enacted in 1996. The INS's inability to
remove this population is a source of great public dissatisfaction with
current enforcement efforts, but its reputation for administrative
incompetence and political clumsiness goes far beyond the criminal alien
problem. Indeed, a multitude of court decisions, legislative hearings, and
GAO reports have documented its recurrent lawlessness.
Remarkably, even these contextual factors have not stood in the
way of an expansive immigration policy but they do help to explain some
intriguing factors that qualify its political support. Public opinion polls, for
example, indicate that the general public admires the values of the
immigrants that they know personally but that they (like most of the
immigrants themselves) draw a rather sharp distinction between "good"
immigrants and "bad" immigrants. In this view, good immigrants enter the
U.S. legally, work hard, learn English, become naturalized citizens, raise
strong families, and stay out of trouble, while bad ones enter (or remain)
illegally, rely on welfare and other taxpayer-supported benefits, fail to learn
English and assimilate, and commit crimes. In contrast to the political
elites who dominate immigration lawmaking, the general public
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consistently favors lower levels of both legal and illegal immigration.
Americans take pride in their own immigrant past and in the nation's
relatively inclusive traditions, but they also strongly support official
reaffirmations of the nation's commitment to the primacy of the English
language. In short, Americans who favor immigration and diversity still
worry about the number and assimilability of immigrants. Indeed, they
have always worried about this, even before the 1970s when there were
fewer, far less diverse immigrants.
Certain other policies also reflect the institutionalization of
immigration and diversity in American public life. The principle of
birthright citizenship, that every individual (with exceptions that are
irrelevant for present purposes) who is born on United States territory is
automatically and instantaneously a citizen, was established in 1868 by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. This principle, also known as
jus soli, is by no means unique to the U.S.; it was the rule in many other
states, notably England, long before America was founded. In few if any
other jus soli states, however, is the birthright citizenship rule as liberal as
in the American version. Under this version, one born on U.S. soil, even of
parents who are both here illegally and briefly, acquires the status. This
expansive rule has carried the day despite some doubt about whether the
Congress that adopted the Fourteenth Amendment intended this result.
The U.S. also recognizes dual (or even triple) citizenship, a
recognition that greatly facilitates immigrants' assimilation. Multiple
citizenships may be acquired when individuals whose parents are U.S.
citizens are born abroad in countries that confer their own birthright
citizenship, when individuals are born in the U.S. of foreign parents who
can transmit their foreign nationalit(ies) to the child, when citizens of other
states naturalize in the U.S. and retain their original nationalities, or when
U.S. citizens naturalize in other countries. The U.S. is not at all unique in
recognizing and permitting dual citizenship; even states like Germany that
still do not think of themselves as states of immigration and that
traditionally opposed dual citizenship are now making it somewhat easier to
acquire and retain. Indeed, the U.S., unlike some other states, requires all
newly naturalizing citizens to take an oath renouncing their other
nationalities, although they may retain another state's nationality if, as is
increasingly the case, the other state does not give legal effect to its
nationals' renunciations. No one knows the number of dual citizens in the
U.S. but the number is certainly growing, especially as many sending states
now seek to facilitate the acquisition of U.S. citizenship by their nationals.
Acquisition of citizenship through naturalization in the U.S. is easy
and swift compared to the practice in most other industrialized nations,
although here, too, practices are converging. Even Germany, the standard
example of an ethnically-defined nation, has now relaxed its language and
other requirements for naturalization. In the U.S., the residency, moral,
knowledge of civics, and other requirements are relatively easy to satisfy;
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very few individuals who complete their petitions are rejected, and the
English language test is notoriously simple to pass. (In a recent study many
newly-naturalized citizens self-reported that they cannot speak English.)
The political institutionalization of this easy naturalization regime is
suggested both by how few changes have been enacted since 1917 when the
literacy test was established, and by the failure of today's restrictionists to
persuade Congress to enact reforms in the face of unprecedented linguistic
and other diversities magnifying the obstacles to assimilation.
This assimilation challenge, of course, confronts all receiving
countries, not just the United States. The American approach to
assimilation, however, appears to be unique. Other states view the
integration of immigrants as largely a governmental responsibility
demanding national and sometimes local policy interventions. In contrast,
the U.S. treats assimilation as primarily the responsibility of the immigrants
themselves, perhaps aided by their ethnic communities at the local level.
This approach, which is consistent with the more general commitments to
limited government, privatism, and laissez-faire arrangements characteristic
of the American public philosophy, emphasizes the primacy of individual
and communal responsibility for individuals' social identities and welfare.
In this view, government's role is to provide immigrants' children
(undocumented as well as legally admitted) with access to publicly-funded
education, including civics and English instruction. Adult immigrants,
however, are presumed to have powerful economic and social incentives to
learn English through their own devices, though long waiting lists for
English language classes suggest that more help may be needed. Civics
instruction for adults often falls by the wayside, at least until they decide to
naturalize (and perhaps even then, given the rudimentary nature of the
civics test).
Since the welfare reforms of 1996, non-citizen immigrants are
ineligible for non-emergency social welfare benefits under federal law.
This reflects not only a budget priority decision about the allocation of
scarce welfare benefits but also a widespread public view that immigrants
should not be assimilated into a culture that legitimates dependency on
taxpayer support. Having strongly repudiated this culture of dependency
for U.S. citizens, Congress could hardly treat immigrants differently. This
makes even more noteworthy the fact that the major immigrant-receiving
U.S. states have responded to the federal cut-off of immigrants by
extending wholly state-funded benefits to many legal immigrants.
Many immigrant advocates contend that the U.S. has turned its
back on immigrants, citing not only welfare reform but also the passage, in
1996, of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA). IIRIRA, enacted at the end of the decade to protect America, is
the most radical reform of immigration law in decades, or perhaps ever,
revamping enforcement in ways that even many INS officials find arbitrary,
unfair, and unworkable. As I have argued elsewhere, many of the law's
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procedures are harsh and unjust, will have perverse effects, and should be
changed. Indeed, challenges to the constitutionality of some of these
provisions are now being heard by the Supreme Court. Even IIRIRA's
recklessness and unfairness, however, should not obscure a fundamental
fact. Although the new law is certainly tough on undocumented and
criminal aliens and arbitrary toward asylum seekers and deportation
hardship cases, it has little effect on the vast majority of immigrants who
have always abided by U.S. laws.
Indeed, an assessment of public attitudes in the U.S. today toward
even some "bad" immigrants must also take account of the new amnesty
programs enacted in the late 1990s to protect many undocumented migrants
from Central America. These amnesties will probably be expanded once
again in the near future to include other undocumented migrants from the
region as well as others who have been in the U.S. since the mid-1980s.
Together with a continuing high level of permanent legal immigration and
increased guestworkers, these amnesties constitute better evidence of our
immigration policy's comparative inclusiveness than the IIRIRA's use of
many over-broad, Procrustean, and harsh provisions to secure the removal
of criminal aliens.
CONCLUSION
Two paradigms of immigration compete for the public's attention
and allegiance. The first, captured in the iconic symbolism of the Statue of
Liberty and the melting pot, is boundlessly optimistic. It boasts pride in our
brave ancestors who came (or were dragged in chains) to America's shores
and who built the country literally from the ground up. It celebrates the
immigrant mythos as a parable for our time, and for all time, of success
against great odds. The continuing vitality of this mythos today is confirmed
by social mobility of the Korean greengrocer, the West Indian professional,
the Taiwanese engineer, the Indian computer programmer, the Filipino
nurse, and countless other immigrants.
The second paradigm is one of anxiety and doubt. It is captured in
the imagery of Mexicans streaming across the southern border (flood
metaphors are especially popular), Dominicans on welfare in New York
City, juvenile street gangs and adult tongs in Chinatowns across the
country, third world terrorists bent on stealthy destruction, illiterate Hmong
tribesmen transplanted to communities unprepared to deal with them, and
costly bilingual education programs that fail to teach English effectively.
Instead of optimism, there is fear that America's assimilative capacity has
finally been exhausted, that we are losing control over our sovereignty and
destiny, and that we have become the victims of our own generosity, the
dupes of our own history and illusions.
We can learn much by taking both of these paradigms seriously.
Immigration carries significant risks as well as alluring opportunities. The
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nature of these risks and opportunities, and the precise balance between
them, are constantly changing and thus must be open for public debate. In a
kind of political path dependency, however, the U.S. has maintained a
receptiveness to immigrants that remains distinctive in the world, a
willingness to accept a level of convulsive social change that other liberal
democratic societies, most of which are more avowedly egalitarian than the
U.S., have considered to verge on cultural suicide. The future, I think, will
be much kinder to our tradition than to theirs. Immigration and diversity are
aspects of American exceptionalism that they would do well to emulate--
while they still have some choice in the matter.

